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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

104040

COUNTRY Germany (Russian Zone)

DATE: 25X1A

SUBJECT The LDP Convention

This document is hereby regraded to CONFIDENTIAL in accordance with the letter of 16 October 1978 from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of the Office of Security.

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(Amie + June) - 25 Aug. 1947

1. A few days before the opening of the LDP zonal convention in Eisenach, Dr. Wilhelm Kuhl, LDP chairman, was called to Karlshorst for a lengthy discussion of party matters. The main topic was the so-called "revolt" of the Thuringian and Berlin LDP members who had criticized the attitude of the representatives from the Eastern Zone at the Munich Conference. The Russians considered this as sabotaging their program of democratization.

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For Lieutenant to attend the convention of the democratic parties in southern Germany at the end of June, since his presence would have provoked the accusation that the LDP was entirely submissive to the Russians, a reputation he had gained through his staunch support of the bloc policy. As a consequence of the strained relations between the West and the Soviet Union, in regard to the policy on world matters, a certain willingness for rapprochement had been noticeable even within LDP circles.

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3. The Russians wanted to know if the opinion expressed by the Thuringian and Berlin members might lead to repercussions during the convention in Eisenach. [redacted] gave them to understand that he had already discussed the matter in inner party circles and that he had made it clear that a change in the party leadership at the present time might endanger the entire LDP program. He assured the SMA that the remarks made after the Munich Conference amounted only to differences of opinion which affected in no way the actual political course of the LDP.

4. The Russians made it clear that they would interpret the forced resignation of Dr. Kuhl as an anti-Soviet move and would be obliged to apply pressure in case a change in leadership should disclose a tendency away from the bloc policy. The re-election of Dr. Kuhl would be considered by the SMA as proof that the LDP was following in German politics the same line as that pursued by Moscow.

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5. Dr. K^ulz found out a few days before the opening of the Eisenach Convention that Russian officers had approached the principal LDP delegates from the several states and had given them a similar talk.
6. The LDP had encountered difficulties in regard to housing and food allocations while making preliminary arrangements for the convention; however, the Russians reversed their attitude a few days prior to the opening of the convention and became very cooperative.
7. Another important subject under discussion was the SPD policy. Dr. K^ulz was requested to use LDP newspapers and party meetings for exposing the nationalistic tendencies of the Schumacher SPD. It was suggested that he point out that the SPD had not been admitted to the Socialist Conference in Zurich, Switzerland, showing that the Social Democrats in Germany were considered to be following today the footsteps of fascism. It should be stressed, the Russian said, that the SPD was being more and more encouraged by foreign imperialists in its nationalistic tendencies. The Russians pointed out that the experience of the last two years had clearly shown that the present set-up of the party system, adapted to German conditions, was a strengthening democratic factor and that Moscow had no intention of sacrificing it in favor of a one-party system.
8. It is believed by persons close to Dr. K^ulz that K^ulz himself is beginning to realize that he was wrong in assuming originally that he would be able to win the full confidence of the Russians by acquiescing in their demands, and that in the end he would be offered a high position in the Reich Government which would enable him to use his influence in the interest of European politics. Even his closest friends, who defended his policy in the past, admit at present that K^ulz is entirely submissive to Russian demands.

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Comments: For related information on this subject see Report

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